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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työpaikkainnovaatioiden vaikutuksia sairauspoissaoloihin ja työtapatur-
miin. Työpaikkainnovaatioilla tarkoitetaan itseohjautuvia tiimejä, informaation jakamista, työnantajan 
tarjoamaa koulutusta sekä kannustinpalkkausta. Tutkimuksessa käytetään Tilastokeskuksen työolotut-
kimusta vuodelta 2008. Yhden yhtälön mallien perusteella havaitaan, että työpaikkainnovaatiot kas-
vattavat työntekijöiden ja alempien toimihenkilöiden lyhyitä sairauspoissaoloja. Kahden yhtälön mal-
lien avulla, joissa voidaan huomioida se, että työpaikkainnovaatiot ovat endogeenisia muuttujia pää-




The paper examines the effect of innovative work practices on the prevalence of sickness absence and 
accidents at work. We focus on several different aspects of workplace innovations (self-managed 
teams, information sharing, employer-provided training and incentive pay) along with the “bundles” 
of those practices. We use nationally representative individual-level data from the Finnish Quality of 
Work Life Survey from 2008. Using single equation models, we find that innovative work practices 
increase short-term sickness absence for blue-collar and lower white-collar employees. In two-
equation models that treat innovative workplace practices as endogenous variables we do not find 
relationship between innovative work practices and sickness absence or accidents at work.  
 
JEL classification: I12, J28 
Keywords: innovative work practices, workplace innovation, sickness absence, accidents 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Innovative work practices such as self-managed teams and incentive pay have become a regular 
feature of contemporary human resource management. These workplace innovations aim at more 
flexibility in the work organization, enhanced labor-management cooperation, greater employee 
involvement in decision making, and financial participation of the employees (Ichniowski  et al., 
1996). Most studies find that innovative work practices have positive impacts on firm-level 
performance (see e.g. Ichniowski et al., 1997; Bartel, 2004; Black and Lynch, 2004).
1 
There is a much smaller body of literature on what innovative work practices do to employees, and 
the findings from it are contradictory. Some authors argue that employers gain at the expense of the 
employees (Ramsay et al., 2000; Harley, 2005), while others maintain that in the high-performance 
workplaces both employers and employees end up being better off (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Handel 
and Levine, 2004).  
One part of the literature on the potential drawbacks of innovative work practices on the employee outcomes 
concerns their effects on employee health. Traditionally, these questions have been approached on a case-
study basis, as representative data sets containing information on both participation in innovative work 
practices and employee health outcomes have been lacking (ILO, 1998). However, this line of research has 
expanded in a more quantitative direction recently. Askenazy (2001), and Fairris and Brenner (2001) 
investigate the relationship between innovative work practices and workplace injuries using establishment 
data originating from Osterman’s (1994) survey of U.S. establishments. They find evidence of a positive 
relationship between innovative work practices and various occupational injuries. Brenner et al. (2004) also 
find a positive relationship between innovative work practices and cumulative trauma disorders in their study 
using U.S. establishment-level data. Askenazy and Caroli (2010) use individual-level data from a supplement 
of the French Labor Force Survey from 1998 to examine whether there is a relationship between innovative 
work practices and mental strain, occupational risks, and occupational injuries. With the help of propensity 
score matching methods they discover that employees who are involved in innovative work practices are 
significantly worse off in terms of occupational hazards than those who are not. On the other hand, Askenazy 
and Caroli (2010) find that information and communication technologies provide employees with a safer 
workplace. Finally, there are related studies that examine the effects using information on satisfaction. Green 
and Heywood (2008) observe that performance pay increases job satisfaction. Jones et al. (2009) report that 
satisfaction with employer-provided training reduces absenteeism and Barth  et al. (2009) find that 
management innovations lower job satisfaction.  
                                                                 
 
1 However, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) find more mixed results.    5 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the employee outcomes of innovative work practices 
by studying their effect on sickness absence and accidents at work. While the studies that focus on 
cumulative disorders and other specific injuries or illnesses are useful, they may not capture the whole 
effect of innovative work practices. There may thus be effects on other illnesses and the general well-
being of employees as well that can be captured by analyzing the prevalence of sickness absence. One 
advantage of focusing on sickness absence and accidents at work is that they are objective measures 
of the employee outcomes, unlike job satisfaction. Also, by focusing on sickness absence, we are able 
to contribute to the literature on the determinants of sickness absence in economics (e.g. Barmby et 
al., 2004), which has not paid particular attention to the effects of innovative work practices. 
We use nationally representative individual -level data from the Finnish Quality of Work Life Survey 
from 2008, which includes information on participation in innovative work practices as well as 
information on sickness absence and occupational accidents. The survey contains information on 
several different aspects of workplace innovations (self-managed teams, information sharing, 
employer-provided training and incentive pay). We start with straightforward probit models in which 
we explain sickness absence and treat innovative work practices as an exogenous variable. However, 
innovative workplace practices are not randomly assigned to firms, but may be determined jointly 
with sickness absence. For this reason, our preferred estimates are based on the recursive models in 
which innovative work practices are treated as endogenous variables. Our identification strategy is 
based on the use of information on foreign ownership. The recursive modeling is also able to take into 
account otherwise omitted variables. For example, workplaces with extremely competent managers 
may have both high employer-provided training and fewer accidents.   
The Finnish case has a broader interest for at least three reasons. First, innovative work practices have 
gained popularity in Finland rapidly during the past 10 years. A major part of this development has 
been caused by the foreign-owned firms that have often been among the first to adapt these practices 
(Tainio and Lilja, 2003). Second, Finland has the highest share of sickness absenteeism in Europe 
(Gimeno et al., 2004a).
2 Thus, sickness absences cause a substantial reduction in actual working time. 
Third, according to the arguments in the literature (e.g. Belangér et al., 2002; Godard 2001, 2004), the 
high unionization rate (~70%) together with deep co-operation between employees and employers in 
Finland should provide an exceptionally fertile ground for the benefits of innovative work practices to 
emerge. For this reason, it is interesting to examine whether one is still able to find some negative 
effects of these practices on the employee outcomes. 
                                                                 
 
2 The earlier Finnish research on sickness absence (e.g. Kivimäki et al., 2000; Virtanen et al., 2001; Vahtera et 
al., 2004) have used data from  very specific sectors of the labor market, like the municipal sector. It has not 
considered the effects of innovative work practices.    6 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Innovative work practices increase employee discretion and opportunities to participate in decision 
making, give employees incentives to participate, and provide them with skills needed to participate 
(e.g. Appelbaum et al., 2000). Increased discretion often follows from participating in self-managed 
teams, while incentives are usually financial, and sufficient skills are achieved with employer-
provided training. Such work practices transform the work of employees, especially in blue-collar 
occupations. 
The impact of innovative work practices on employees has received attention recently. Two views 
stand out in the literature. The first view argues that innovative work practices make work more 
rewarding, meaningful and challenging by increasing discretion (e.g. Appelbaum et al., 2000). This 
view predicts that employees should generally benefit from innovative work practices.
3 According to 
Karasek’s (1979) demands-control model, increased discretion should lead to lower occupational 
stress. This view does not address the impact of innovative work practices on workload directly, but, 
for example, in the view of Appelbaum et al. (2000) these practices should lead to working smarter, 
not harder. Thus, according to this view, innovative work practices should affect sickness absence 
only a little, and mostly through decreased stress.  
The second view takes a more critical stance. This strand of literature argues that innovative work 
practices increase the workload and the pace of work, and in reality increase the control possibilities 
of employees only a little (Ramsay et al., 2000; Harley 2005). Berggren (1993) argues that while 
employee discretion may increase in other ways, they potentially lose control, especially over the 
pace of work. Increased pace of work in turn increases the likelihood of sickness absence and 
occupational  injury. Again, according to Karasek’s (1979) model of occupational stress, increased 
demands at work coupled with no change in discretion should lead to increased stress. Additionally, 
the new practices, such as self-managed teams, may substitute supervisor control with peer control, 
which can be more stressful for employees (Barker, 1993). Thus, according to the critical view, 
innovative work practices increase the incidence of sickness absence and occupational injuries by 
intensifying work and increasing stress. 
Innovative work practices are most likely to transform the work of blue-collar employees. For this 
reason, it is likely that they have the largest effect on the sickness absence of blue-collar employees. 
Especially, the arguments about the increasing pace of work are most likely to be relevant for blue-
                                                                 
 
3 See e.g. Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) for more thorough discussion of the different views on the impact of 
innovative work practices on employees.     7 
collar employees. The case of innovative work practices and stress is more ambiguous: white-collar 
employees can be substantially affected by, for example, increased peer control also.  
Different components of innovative work practices, such as self-managed teams, incentive pay, and 
training, may have a distinct and even contradictory impact on sickness absence. Incentive pay, 
especially in blue-collar occupations, may lead to an increased workload and pace of work. The 
Finnish collective agreements implicitly define different working speeds for the time rates and piece 
rates, but the apparent heterogeneity of workplaces makes it hard for the collective agreements to take 
into account all relevant aspects. Self-managed teams, on the one hand, give employees more 
discretion, but on the other hand they may increase stress, due to peer monitoring. Employer-provided 
training can also increase peer pressure among employees affected.  
Innovative work practices can affect short-term and long-term sickness absence differently. If the 
critics are correct, and innovative work practices increase the pace of work, they may increase short-
term sickness absence more than long-term sickness absence. On the other hand, if the impact comes 
mainly through stress, it may show up mostly in the prevalence of long-term sickness absence (e.g. 
Gimeno et al., 2004b).  
To sum up, it is a priori unclear whether innovative work practices affect sickness absence or not. 
The potential  impact may vary in different employee groups or the practices may affect short-term 
and long-term absence in different manner.  
 
3. DATA 
We use the latest wave of the Quality of Work Life Survey (QWLS) of Statistics Finland (SF) from 
2008. QWLS provides a representative sample of Finnish wage and salary earners (i.e. the self-
employed are excluded), because the initial sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labor Force 
Survey (LFS) of SF, where a random sample of the working age population is selected for a telephone 
interview. The fact that QWLS is a representative sample of employees is a great advantage, because 
many of the earlier studies on the effects of workplace innovations have used data on a few 
manufacturing industries or single firms. The estimates for certain sectors and firms could be subject 
to substantial selection bias, if the unobserved factors that determine whether employees choose to 
work in the sector or firm also influence their absenteeism. Another very useful characteristic of 
QWLS is that the unit of observation corresponds to the “treatment” unit, because we have both the 
participation information and outcome measures at the individual level. This is important, because the   8 
most natural level of analysis of employee outcomes such as sickness absence is the individual level. 
Furthermore, Ichniowski  et al. (1996) point out that establishment and firm surveys such as 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey in the UK may suffer from serious response bias, because the 
most successful firms with workplace innovations may be more likely to participate in the surveys.
4 
This problem does not prevail in our data.     
The 2008 QWLS was based on LFS respondents in March and April who were 15-64 years old with a 
normal weekly working time of at least 10 hours. 6,499 individuals were selected for the QWLS 
sample and invited to participate in a personal face-to-face interview. Out of this sample 4,392 
persons, or around 68%, participated (see Lehto and Sutela,  2009).
5  The average length of the 
interviews was 66 minutes. Face-to-face interviews ensure reliable answers to almost all questions. 
Owing to missing information on some variables for some employees, our sample size used with the 
estimations is about 4,300 observations. This gives us considerable  statistical power. QWLS is 
supplemented with information from LFS and several registers maintained by SF. For example, 
information about the educational level of employees originates from the Register of Completed 
Education and Degrees.  
Sickness absences are documented as the number of days absent from work because of illness during 
the past 12 months. (The exact number of days absent is not reported in the survey. Instead, the 
respondents have reported them by means of categories: the number of absences lasting 1-3 days, 4-9 
days and those lasting at least 10 days.) Sickness absences are self-reported, but there is no particular 
reason to believe that employees gave systematically biased answers, because their identity was not 
revealed to their employers after the survey.
6 QWLS also contains short sickness absences that are not 
recorded by the Social Insurance Institution (KELA), which pays out sickness benefits to the 
employees affected. The reason for this is that short sickness absences do not entitle employees to the 
payment of sickness benefits, but they obtain normal pay from their employers. This is an important 
advantage of QWLS, because most of the absences are short.
7 The 2008 QWLS data do not contain 
information about the duration of individual sickness spells, however. We form an indicator for those 
who have been absent at least once from work due to illness during the past 12 months. This indicator 
                                                                 
 
4 Bryson et al. (2008) describe the strengths and weaknesses of WERS. 
5 Lehto and Sutela (2009) provide a detailed analysis of response vs. non-response. Their conclusion is that non-
response is not undermining the representativeness of the QWLS data. 
6 To check the external validity of the measure of sickness absence, we have compared information from QWLS 
to the employer survey conducted by the Confederation of Finnish Industries (2007). These two sources give a 
comparable picture of sickness absence in the private sector. However, it is possible that there is some bias 
against self-reporting absence due to mental sickness. This could be a problem especially for white-collar 
workers. We are not able to quantify this potential bias.   
7 Around half of all employees in Finland can be absent from work at least three days without a medical 
certificate, according to the collective agreements.   9 
constitutes our most important dependent variable. We also use an indicator for those who have been 
absent over 15 days. (The exact number of days absent is approximated by using the mean points of 
the above-mentioned categories.) Furthermore, we examine the effects of workplace innovations on 
the prevalence of accidents at work during the past 12 months.  
We capture four different aspects of innovative work practices (i.e. high-performance workplace 
systems, HPWS). These measures correspond to the central pieces of a high-performance workplace 
from the point of view of employees, as outlined in Appelbaum et al. (2000). Self-managed teams are 
defined as teams that select their own foremen and decide on the internal division of responsibilities. 
Information sharing equals one if employees are informed about the changes at work at the planning 
stage rather  than shortly before the change or at its implementation. Training equals one if the 
employee has participated in employer-provided training during the past 12 months.
8 Incentive pay 
equals one if the person has performance-related pay and bonuses are based on the employee’s own 
effort. To examine the joint effects of innovative work practices, we identify “bundles”. Because there 
is no single definition for summary measures (e.g. Blasi and Kruse, 2006; Kalmi and Kauhanen, 
2008), we follow a simple strategy. “Bundles” are captured by our variable HPWS, which equals one 
if more than one of the aspects of workplace innovations (self-managed teams, information sharing, 
employer-provided training or incentive pay) is present.
9 We include a vector of control variables to 
all models that can be regarded as ‘the usual suspects’, based on the absenteeism literature (e.g. 
Brown and Sessions, 1996; Holmlund, 2004; Dionne and Dostie, 2007).  The exact definitions 




To make it easier to understand the estimates from probit models, they are reported as marginal 
effects on the probability of being absent (or experiencing an accident at work). For binary variables, 
these are calculated as differences in the predicted probabilities. The baseline results in Table I (Panel 
A) reveal that the “bundles” of workplace innovations increase sickness absence, but they are 
                                                                 
 
8 For comparison, the means for the variables that capture self-managed teams, information sharing and training 
are very close to the ones reported by Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) from the 2003 QWLS. Bassanini et al. (2005) 
observe by using various data sources from the 1990s that roughly 50% of all Finnish employees have received 
some employer-provided training in one year. This share is higher than in most other countries in Europe.  
9 We do not use bigger “bundles” of workplace innovations, because they are relatively rare in the data. For 
example, only 11% of all employees are affected by more than two different aspects of innovative workplace 
practices.   10 
unrelated to long-term sickness absence and accidents at work. The estimated marginal effect in the 
sickness absence equation is considerable. To illustrate this, according to the point estimate, those 
who participate in HPWS have roughly a 4 percent higher probability of reporting a positive number 
of absences during the past 12 months, other things being equal. For comparison, the results from the 
same model in the Appendix, Table AII, reveal that females are approximately 5 percent more likely 
to report a positive number of absences and it is one of the stylized facts of the literature that females 
have higher sickness absence rates (e.g. Holmlund, 2004; Ichino and Moretti, 2009). Regarding the 
control variables (the Appendix, Table AII), the role of adverse working conditions as a determinant 
of sickness absence is particularly important, which is in accordance with the results of a study on the 
1997 QWLS (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2008).  
Table I here 
 
Table I (Panel B) reports the results for different aspects of HPWS. The positive effect is not present 
for self-managed teams, information sharing and incentive pay, but it prevails for employer-provided 
training. Furthermore, there is a positive effect of incentive pay on the probability of being absent 
over 15 days during the past 12 months (Table I , Panel B). Otherwise, there are no statistically 
significant results for long-term sickness absence or accidents at work.  
We estimate models separately for employees with a different socio-economic status, because the 
evidence shows that employees in more complex (white-collar) jobs are more likely to participate in a 
HPWS (e.g. Kauhanen, 2009), and because, as argued earlier, the effects of innovative work practices 
on sickness absence may differ between socio-economic groups. The average of our HPWS variable 
is 0.25 and 0.57 for blue-collar employees and upper white-collar employees, respectively. Firms 
allocate authority to employees in uncertain, more complex settings that typically involve white-collar 
employees, because the employees have a better idea of the correct actions to take in these settings 
(Prendergast, 2002). We do not present separate estimates for accidents among upper white-collar 
employees, because the incidence of accidents at work is very low among them. (The average of our 
Accident variable is 0.016 for upper white-collar employees.)  
The estimates in Table II (Panels A and B) reveal that the positive effects of the “bundles” of 
workplace innovations on sickness absence are particularly pronounced for blue-collar and lower 
white-collar employees.  This supports the argument that innovative work practices transform 
especially the work of blue-collar employees and thus affect their sickness absence most. Thus, there 
are no influences on the outcomes for upper white-collar employees (Table II, Panel C). We also find 
that long-term sickness absence and accidents at work are not affected by the “bundles”. The results 
in Table III confirm the earlier pattern in Table I according to which employer-provided training is   11 
the most important separate aspect of HPWS that has an influence on sickness absence. There are also 
the statistically significant effects of incentive pay for long-term sickness absence among blue-collar 
and lower white-collar employees. 
Tables II-III here 
 
Next we turn to the recursive models to study the robustness of the baseline results, because the most 
serious concern of the reduced-form estimates is that innovative work practices may be endogenous in 
the sense that employees, for example, working in certain types of firms are more likely to be exposed 
to innovative work practices. The recursive models are formed by means of two equations that are 
estimated jointly. In the first equation we explain the binary indicators of workplace innovations, by 
the variables X1 in a probit model. X1 includes individual and workplace characteristics. In the second 
equation, a binary indicator of sickness absence (or the prevalence of accidents at work) is explained 
in another probit model by workplace innovations and the variables X2, which includes individual and 
workplace characteristics.  
The model forms a system of probit models that has an endogenous dummy explanatory variable.
10
 
We assume that there are unobserved characteristics and, therefore, the error terms of the probit 
models are correlated. The unobserved characteristics can, for example, be unobservable individual 
health characteristics that influence sickness absence. For this reason, the results from the recursive 
models may differ from the ones based on the reduced-form models. The system is recursive, because 
the prevalence of sickness absence does not explain workplace innovations. This is a reasonable 
assumption, because innovative work practices are introduced by the management and they are thus 
predetermined for employees. It is possible to estimate the model as a multivariate probit model (see 
Greene, 2003). We use the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulated maximum likelihood estimator 
implemented to Stata by Cappelari and Jenkins (2003). No exclusion restrictions are needed for the 
identification of the parameters, because the model is non-linear (Wilde, 2000). However, using the 
exclusion restrictions improves the validity of tests of exogeneity of the endogenous dummy 
explanatory variable (essentially, a test of whether the correlation of the error terms of the probit 
models is zero) (Monfardini and Radice, 2008). Thus, we assume that the variables X1 and X 2 are not 
exactly the same.  
                                                                 
 
10 Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009) use similar recursive models to examine the connection between 
employees’ quit intentions and actual separations.   12 
The identification assumption of the recursive structure is that foreign ownership increases the 
probability to adopt workplace innovations, but it does not have an influence on the prevalence of 
sickness absence (and accidents at work).
11 Thus, foreign ownership appears in the first probit model 
for workplace innovations, but it is not included in the second probit model in which sickness absence 
(or accidents at work) is used as a dependent variable. Otherwise, the explanatory variables X1 and X2 
of the two probit models are the same, as listed in the Appendix (Table AI). 
The results in Tables IV-V v alidate our approach for the exclusion of foreign ownership from the 
second probit model. The effect of foreign ownership on the “bundles” of workplace innovations is 
statistically and economically significant. The “bundles” are roughly 9 percent more likely to appear 
in foreign-owned firms, other things being equal (Table IV, Column 1). This result is in accordance 
with the descriptive account of the dispersion of workplace innovations to Finland in Tainio and Lilja 
(2003), and the econometric estimates in Kauhanen (2009), based on the 2003 QWLS. In contrast, 
foreign ownership is clearly unrelated to the prevalence of sickness absence and accidents at work 
during the past 12 months (Table IV, Columns 2-3).
12 Regarding the effects on sickness absence, this 
confirms the pattern reported in Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2008). Employer-provided training and 
incentive pay are the separate aspects of innovative work practices that are positively affected by 
foreign ownership (Table V, Columns 3-4). This is consistent with Tainio and Lilja (2003), who argue 
that the increase in the popularity of incentive pay in Finland during the past 10 years has been 
especially driven by foreign-owned firms. Based on these patterns, we focus on the “bundles” along 
with employer-provided training and incentive pay in the following.   
Tables IV-V here 
 
The results from the recursive models are summarized in Tables VI-VII. We estimate separate models 
for the “bundles” (Table VI) and different aspects of HPWS (Table VII). We report the estimates for 
the measures of innovative work practices from the second probit equation for sickness absence or 
accidents at work. (The coefficients of other explanatory variables included are not reported in order 
to save space, but they are available upon  request.) Note that the figures in Tables VI-VII are the 
estimated coefficients, not the marginal effects, which would vary between different combinations of 
outcomes.
13  The results reveal that the “bundles” of workplace innovations are not statistically 
significant determinants of sickness absence in the recursive models even though most of the point 
                                                                 
 
11 The data do not allow us to identify specific foreign ownership. However, almost all foreign ownership in 
Finland originates from Western Europe.  
12 However, there is some evidence (not shown in Table IV) that long-term sickness absence is related to foreign 
ownership. For this reason, it is not studied in the context of the recursive models.  
13 The number of random draws used in the estimations was 70. The exception is the model for accidents among 
lower white-collar employees in which we used 50 draws due to the convergence problems in the procedure.      13 
estimates are positive (Table VI). Interestingly, there is some indication that the “bundles” decrease 
accidents at work for blue-collar employees. (In this specification the correlation between the error 
terms of the probit equations is 0.5058 with the z-value of 1.69. The correlation emerges from 
unobserved characteristics.) Thus, in these respects, the results from the recursive models differ from 
the reduced-form models.  On the other hand,  we find that employer-provided training has 
qualitatively similar effect to the ones in the reduced-form models (Table VII, Panels A and D). In the 
model for upper white-collar employees the correlation between the error terms of the probit 
equations is -0.6142 with the z-value of -2.15. In addition, there is evidence that incentive pay reduces 
accidents at work among blue-collar employees. (The correlation between the error terms of the probit 
equations is 0.6464 with the z-value of 2.32.)  
Tables VI-VII here 
 
Why employer-provided training seems to  increase sickness absence? One apparent explanation for 
this pattern is that workplace innovations reduce various forms of slack time at workplaces. This 
raises the pace of work  and stress considerably, which positively contributes to the prevalence of 
sickness absence, as outlined in our conceptual framework. To test the existence of this channel of 
influence, we estimated a simple probit model in which the dependent variable equals one when an 
employee feels he or she is under the pressure of heavy work almost all the time or roughly ¾ of the 
time. (The average of the variable is 19%.) The results reveal that employer-provided training obtains 
a marginal value of 0.0483 with the z-value of 3.97. Thus, those employees that have received any 
form training provided and paid for by the employer during the past 12 months are some 5% more 
likely to work under the pressure of heavy work, according to their own assessment. This correlation 
is in accordance with the view that takes a critical stance on innovative work practices. In particular, it 
supports the thinking that innovative work practices may sometimes induce employees to deliver “too 
much” effort in the sense that they are forced to take unintended breaks from the job. These effects 
could be particularly pronounced for upper white-collar employees, because their work involves more 
opportunities for discretion than the more standardized work conducted by blue-collar employees at 
the factory floor.         
   14 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research has shown that the introduction of innovative work practices most likely has a 
beneficial effect on firm-level performance. Here we look at the impact on employees in terms of 
sickness absence and accidents at work. Conceptual framework suggests that the impact of innovative 
work practices on sickness absence may differ between employee groups and absence measures (any 
absence, long-term absence, accidents at work).  
In single equation models we find that participation in a HPWS increases short-term sickness absence 
for blue-collar and lower white-collar employees. We do not find any effects on longer sickness 
absence or accidents at work. In the case of upper white-collar employees we find no evidence that 
HPWS are related to sickness absence. In recursive two-equation models that take into account the 
potential endogeneity of HPWS, we do not find any evidence that HPWS affects sickness absence. 
This holds irrespective of the employee group or the outcome considered. To sum up, the only 
evidence of positive link between absence and HPWS that we find pertain to short-term absence for 
blue-collar and lower white-collar employees when using single equation models. Our results are 
contrary to the ones in the earlier literature, which has shown a positive relationship between sickness 
absence and HPWS. However, our outcome measures are broader than the ones considered 
previously, which has mainly considered cumulative disorders and other specific injuries. Thus our 
results point to the conclusion that in general HPWS have little impact on the health of employees.  
That our results are somewhat more positive from the employee point of view when compared to the 
few existing studies may also be partly due to the Finnish institutions. Concerning other employee 
outcomes, including job satisfaction, Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008) find using Finnish data that HPWS 
have mainly positive effects for employees whereas in other literature the findings have been much 
more mixed. They hypothesize that the Finnish labor market institutions may affect these results. Co-
operation between employees and employers seems to support  the benefits of innovative work 
practices. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the effects that we do find seem to go through on-the-job training. 
Those who have received employer-provided training are more likely to report that they work under 
heavy pressure, and are also absent from work more often due to sickness. Thus, in the design of 
innovative workplace practices and incentive systems, firms should pay particular attention to the 
pace of work and its potential consequences for sickness absence. Otherwise, firms cannot reap the 
full benefits of these practices and there is a danger that firms’ costs will increase. 
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Table I. The effect of innovative work practices on sickness absence and accidents 
 
 
Panel A: “Bundles”  
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
HPWS  0.0415**  0.0027  -0.0027 
  (0.0163)  (0.0115)  (0.0055) 
       
N  4290  4291  4291 
 
Panel B: Different aspects of HPWS  
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
Self-managed teams  -0.0114  -0.0116  0.0058 
  (0.0264)  (0.0186)  (0.0097) 
Information sharing   -0.0076  0.0023  -0.0016 
  (0.0165)  (0.0117)  (0.0055) 
Training  0.0725***  -0.0018  -0.0025 
  (0.0171)  (0.0120)  (0.0054) 
Incentive pay  0.0268  0.0400***  0.0113 
  (0.0189)  (0.0144)  (0.0068) 
       
N  4290  4291  4291 
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The (unreported) control variables are listed in the Appendix (Table AI). Both 
Panel A and Panel B report the results from three different specifications. The estimation results for the control 
variables from the first model in Panel A are reported in the Appendix (Table AII). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.       
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Table II. The effect of HPWS on sickness absence and accidents. 
 
 
Panel A: Blue-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
HPWS  0.0649**  0.0361  -0.0166 
  (0.0322)  (0.0265)  (0.0180) 
       
N   1303  1299  1303 
 
Panel B: Lower white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
HPWS  0.0520**  0.0078  0.0048 
  (0.0249)  (0.0176)  (0.0068) 
       
N   1723  1724  1709 
 
Panel C: Upper white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
HPWS  0.0058  -0.0156  .. 
  (0.0302)  (0.0158)   
       
N   1251  1243   
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The control variables are listed in the Appendix (Table AI). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table III. The effect of different aspects of HPWS on sickness absence and accidents. 
 
 
Panel A: Blue-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
Self-managed teams  -0.0098  -0.0559  0.0170 
  (0.0569)  (0.0365)  (0.0350) 
Information sharing   0.0219  0.0127  -0.0127 
  (0.0335)  (0.0266)  (0.0186) 
Training  0.0836***  0.0307  -0.0053 
  (0.0292)  (0.0233)  (0.0170) 
Incentive pay  0.0272  0.0879***  0.0207 
  (0.0338)  (0.0291)  (0.0207) 
       
N   1303  1299  1303 
 
Panel B: Lower white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
Self-managed teams  0.0045  0.0119  0.0085 
  (0.0415)  (0.0331)  (0.0134) 
Information sharing   -0.0112  0.0080  0.0087 
  (0.0258)  (0.0182)  (0.0071) 
Training  0.0593**  -0.0204  -0.0046 
  (0.0275)  (0.0196)  (0.0068) 
Incentive pay  0.0492  0.0402*  0.0111 
  (0.0307)  (0.0244)  (0.0099) 
       
N   1723  1724  1709 
 
Panel C: Upper white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Sickness absence > 15  Accident positive 
       
Self-managed teams  -0.0413  0.0057  .. 
  (0.0436)  (0.0244)   
Information sharing   -0.0183  0.0021   
  (0.0297)  (0.0154)   
Training  0.0910***  -0.0131   
  (0.0350)  (0.0188)   
Incentive pay  -0.0209  -0.0126   
  (0.0364)  (0.0181)   
       
N   1251  1243   
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The control variables are listed in the Appendix (Table AI). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   22 
Table IV. The effect of foreign ownership on HPWS, sickness absence and accidents. 
 
  HPWS  Sickness absence positive   Accident positive 
       
Foreign firm  0.0887***  0.0198  0.0016 
  (0.0264)  (0.0240)  (0.0087) 
       
N   4291  4290  4291 
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The control variables are listed in the Appendix (Table AI). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table V. The effect of foreign ownership on different aspects of HPWS. 
 
  Self-managed 
teams 
Information sharing  Training  Incentive pay 
         
Foreign firm  -0.0087  -0.0297  0.1028***  0.0633*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0243)  (0.0243)  (0.0220) 
         
N   4291  4291  4291  4291 
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. The control variables are listed in the Appendix (Table AI). Robust standard 
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table VI. The effect of HPWS on sickness absence and accidents from recursive models. 
 
 
Panel A: All employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
HPWS  0.0058 (0.3930)  -0.5873 (0.4413) 
 
Panel B: Blue-collar employees  
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
HPWS  -0.4483 (0.5109)  -0.9024* (0.4708) 
 
Panel C: Lower white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
HPWS  0.1300 (0.5297)  -0.3718 (0.6888) 
 
Panel D: Upper white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
HPWS  0.3964 (0.6701)  .. 
 
Notes: Each entry of the table reports the key coefficient of interest from different specifications of the 
multivariate probit model. Only dependent variable 2 (Sickness absence positive, Accident positive) differs 
between the estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   23 




Panel A: All employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
Training  0.7948** (0.2943)    -0.6121* (0.3306) 
Incentive pay  0.4091 (0.2797)  -0.1215 (0.6328) 
 
Panel B: Blue-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
Training  -0.5506 (0.4381)  -0.3366 (0.4469) 
Incentive pay  0.0455 (0.8641)  -0.9419** (0.4614) 
 
Panel C: Lower white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
Training  0.1718 (0.8759)  -1.7527 (1.2575) 
Incentive pay  0.0233 (0.4683)  -0.5505 (0.4675)     
 
Panel D: Upper white-collar employees 
  Sickness absence positive  Accident positive  
     
Training  1.2481** (0.4696)  .. 
Incentive pay  -0.4519 (0.4778)  .. 
 
Notes: Each entry of the table reports the key coefficient of interest from different specifications of the 
multivariate probit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
Table AI. Definition of variables and descriptive statistics. 
 










0.650 (0.477)  Person has been absent at least once from work due to illness 
during the past 12 months = 1, otherwise = 0 
Sickness absence > 15  0.155 (0.362)  Person has been absent over 15 days from work due to illness 
during the past 12 months = 1, otherwise = 0 
Accidents 
Accident positive   0.053 (0.224)  Person has had an accident at work during the past 12 months = 




Innovative work practices 
Self-managed teams  0.090 (0.287)  Person participates in teams that select their own foremen and 
decide on the internal division of responsibilities = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
Information sharing  0.351 (0.477)  Employees are informed about the changes at work at the 
planning stage rather than shortly before the change or at the 
implementation = 1, otherwise = 0 
Training   0.601 (0.490)  Employee has participated in training provided and paid for by 
the employer during the past 12 months = 1, otherwise = 0 
Incentive pay  0.269 (0.443)  Person has performance-related pay and bonuses are based on 
employee’s own effort = 1, otherwise = 0 
HPWS  0.407 (0.491)  More than one of the aspects (self-managed teams, information 




st group)  0.085 (0.278)  Gross monthly wage (excluding overtime bonuses) =< 1300€ = 
1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Wage  (2
nd group)  0.414 (0.493)  1301€ =< monthly wage =< 2300€ = 1, otherwise = 0  
Wage  (3
rd group)  0.310 (0.463)  2301€ =< monthly wage =< 3300€ = 1, otherwise = 0  
Wage  (4
th group)  0.095 (0.294)  3301€ =< monthly wage =< 4000€ = 1, otherwise = 0  
Wage  (5
th group)  0.097 (0.295)  Monthly wage >= 4001€ = 1, otherwise = 0  
Working conditions 
Harm   0.252 (0.434)  At least one adverse factor that affects work ‘very much’ 
(includes heat, cold, vibration, draught, noise, smoke, gas and 
fumes, humidity, inadequate air conditioning, dust, dirtiness of 
work environment, poor or glaring lighting, irritating or 
corrosive substances, restless work environment, repetitive, 
monotonous movements, difficult or uncomfortable working 
positions, time pressure and tight time schedules, heavy lifting, 
lack of space, mildew in buildings) = 1, otherwise = 0 
Hazard  0.380 (0.486)  At least one factor is experienced as ‘a distinct hazard’ 
(includes accident risk, becoming subject to physical violence, 
hazards caused by chemical substances, hazard of infectious   25 
diseases, hazard of skin diseases, risk of strain injuries, risk of 
succumbing to mental disturbance, risk of grave work 
exhaustion, risk of causing serious injury to others, risk of 
causing serious damage to valuable equipment or product) = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Uncertainty  0.685 (0.465)  Work carries at least one insecurity factor (includes transfer to 
other duties, threat of temporary dismissal, threat of permanent 
dismissal, threat of unemployment, threat of becoming 
incapable of work, unforeseen changes, threat of increase in 
workload) = 1, otherwise = 0 
Discrimination  0.377 (0.485)  Person has fallen subject to at least one type of unequal 
treatment or discrimination in current workplace (includes time 
of hiring, remuneration, gain of respect, career advancement 
opportunities, allocation of work shifts, access to training 
provided by employer, receiving information, access to work-
related benefits, attitudes of co-workers or superiors) = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Heavy physically  0.042 (0.200)  Current tasks physically ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
Working time 
Temporary  0.122 (0.327)  Fixed-term employment relationship = 1, otherwise = 0 
Part-timer  0.107 (0.309)  Part-time work = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
Human capital variables 
Female  0.543 (0.498)  1 = female, 0 = male 
Age <=24  0.082 (0.274)  Age <= 24  = 1, otherwise = 0  
Age 25-34  0.213 (0.410)  Age 25-34 = 1, otherwise = 0 
Age 35-44  0.253 (0.435)  Age 35-44 = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Age 45-54  0.268 (0.443)  Age 45-54 = 1, otherwise = 0  
Age 55-64  0.184 (0.387)  Age 55-64 = 1, otherwise = 0 
Married  0.731 (0.444)  Married = 1, otherwise = 0 
Children  0.837 (1.134)  The number of children under 18 living at home 
Comprehensive  0.141 (0.348)  Comprehensive education = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Secondary education  0.447 (0.497)  Upper secondary or vocational education = 1, otherwise = 0 
Polytechnic education  0.290 (0.454)  Polytechnic or lower university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
University education  0.122 (0.328)  Higher university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
Humanities  0.070 (0.255)  Field of education is humanities or teachers’ education = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Business  0.171 (0.377)  Field of education is business, law or social science = 1, 
otherwise = 0  
Technical  0.275 (0.447)  Field of education is technical, natural science or computer 
science = 1, otherwise = 0 
Health care  0.133 (0.339)  Field of education is health care, social work, etc. = 1, 
otherwise = 0 
Blue-collar employee  0.305 (0.461)  Blue-collar employee (hourly waged worker who is most likely 
low-skilled, without a post-secondary education; includes non-
managerial, non-supervisory workers from agriculture, 
manufacturing and services) =1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Lower white-collar 
employee 
0.400 (0.490)  Salaried lower white-collar employee (clerical employee)  =1, 
otherwise = 0 
Upper white-collar 
employee 
0.290 (0.454)  Salaried upper white-collar employee (supervisor or manager) 
=1, otherwise = 0 
Tenure 0-2   0.337 (0.473)  Number of years at the current firm 0-2, otherwise 0 
(reference) 
Tenure 3-12  0.340 (0.474)  Number of years at the current firm 3-12, otherwise 0    26 
Tenure 13-27  0.234 (0.424)  Number of years at the current firm 13-27, otherwise 0  
Tenure > 27   0.089 (0.284)  Number of years at the current firm over 27 years, otherwise 0  
 
Self-assessed health 
Working capacity  8.500 (1.385)  Self-assessment of working capacity. The variable is scaled 
from 0 (total inability to work) to 10 (top condition)  
 
Employer characteristics 
Public sector   0.346 (0.476)  Employer is state or municipality = 1, otherwise  = 0 
Foreign firm  0.130 (0.335)  Employer is private, foreign-owned enterprise = 1, otherwise = 
0 
Plant size <10  0.238 (0.426)  Size of plant under 10 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
Plant size 10-49  0.399 (0.490)  Size of plant 10-49 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Plant size 50-249  0.227 (0.419)  Size of plant 50-249 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Plant size 250-999  0.095 (0.293)  Size of plant 250-999 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
Plant size > 1000  0.042 (0.201)  Size of plant over 1000 employees = 1, otherwise = 0  
Indicators for industries and occupations 
Industries     14 dummies based on Standard Industry Classification 
Regions     6 dummies based on the classification of NUTS2 regions by SF   27 
Table AII. The estimates for the controls. 
 
  Sickness absence positive 
   
HPWS  0.0415** 
  (0.0163) 
   
Wage (2
nd group)  0.0510 
  (0.0333) 
Wage (3
rd group)  0.0276 
  (0.0373) 
Wage (4
th group)  0.0136 
  (0.0444) 
Wage (5
th group)  -0.0187 
  (0.0497) 
Harm  0.0467** 
  (0.0188) 
Hazard  0.0423** 
  (0.0172) 
Uncertainty  0.0249 
  (0.0171) 
Discrimination  0.0360** 
  (0.0161) 
Heavy physically  0.0762** 
  (0.0367) 
Temporary  -0.0768*** 
  (0.0276) 
Part-timer  -0.0458 
  (0.0304) 
Female  0.0532*** 
  (0.0198) 
Age <=24  0.0315 
  (0.0348) 
Age 25-34  0.0544** 
  (0.0235) 
Age 45-54  -0.157*** 
  (0.0233) 
Age 55-64  -0.242*** 
  (0.0291) 
Married  0.0351* 
  (0.0183) 
Children  -0.00926 
  (0.00783) 
Secondary education  -0.0308 
  (0.0268) 
Polytechnic education  -0.0752** 
  (0.0354) 
University education  -0.0758* 
  (0.0455) 
Humanities  0.0511   28 
  (0.0370) 
Business  0.00396 
  (0.0279) 
Technical  0.0288 
  (0.0240) 
Health care  0.0345 
  (0.0320) 
Lower white-collar employee  0.0213 
  (0.0233) 
Upper white-collar employee  0.0440 
  (0.0280) 
Tenure 3-12  0.0228 
  (0.0202) 
Tenure 13-27  -0.0130 
  (0.0247) 
Tenure > 27  0.0353 
  (0.0326) 
Working capacity  -0.0583*** 
  (0.00640) 
Public sector  0.0249 
  (0.0250) 
Foreign firm  0.0162 
  (0.0241) 
Plant size 10-49  0.0609*** 
  (0.0193) 
Plant size 50-249  0.0891*** 
  (0.0215) 
Plant size 250-999  0.134*** 
  (0.0262) 
Plant size > 1000  0.0948*** 
  (0.0364) 
   
N  4290 
 
Notes: The table reports the estimates f or all included explanatory variables (excluding the indicators for 
industries and regions) from the first model in Panel A of Table I. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  